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1 Abstract 
The aim of this work is to explore the effect of a tax financed subsidy on 
corporate behaviour and green investment. Based on the equilibrium 
model of Heinkel, Zechner and Kraus (2001), I will show that a tax 
financed subsidy scheme, with fixed tax rates reduces the importance of 
green investors on corporate behaviour of polluting firms. In addition to 
fixed tax rates a variable tax rate will be evaluated in more detail. In 
particular the number of firms that become reformed is more independent 
of the number of green investors, in the fixed tax rate scheme and 
therefore of exclusionary investment but increases the overall economic 
cost of capital more than in the model presented by Heinkel, Zechner and 
Kraus 2001. With the variable tax rate setting the effect of the subsidy is 
only advantageous for a specific range of green investors compared to the 
settings of Heinkel, Zechner and Kraus 2001. 
 
Keywords: capital gain tax, tax financed subsidy, green investment, 
corporate behaviour 
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2 The Heinkel Zechner Kraus (HKZ) Model 
In the paper The Effect of Green Investment and Corporate Behaviour 
Robert Heinkel, Alan Kraus and Josef Zechner examine the effects of 
exclusionary ethical investing on corporate behaviour in a risk-averse, 
equilibrium setting (Heinkel et al. 2001, further HKZ). They show that fewer 
investors hold polluting firms since green investors only buy shares of non-
polluting firms. This creates a lack of risk sharing within the group of non-
green investors which further leads to lower stock prices for polluting firms, 
thus raising their cost of capital (HKZ, 2001). In the model HKZ assume a 
simplified world with two types’ of investors, both are risk averse. The first 
investors group are the neutral investors who ignore ethical investment 
criteria when forming their optimal portfolio. The second group of investors 
are the green investors who do not invest in firms that do not meet their 
ethical investment criteria, thus implementing ethical screens on their 
portfolio selection. The number of firms in this model is finite and each of 
the two types of firms has one of the two possible production technologies. 
Firms with the production technology that satisfies the needs of green 
investors are clean firms. Firms using the polluting technology do not 
satisfy the ethical criteria of green investors, thus are not taken into their 
portfolio until they reform their operations (HKZ, 2001). The exclusionary 
investment made by green investors can be seen as boycott for firms with 
polluting, unreformed technology. This in turn changes the risk sharing 
opportunities within the market. Due to the fact that there are now fewer 
neutral inventors in the market who would buy the shares of firms with 
polluting technology, the share price falls. This can be seen as a reaction 
due to the lost diversification possibilities. In their model, HKZ allow 
polluting firms to make them selves acceptable to green investors at a 
certain cost. What HKZ are trying to find out is if the presence of green 
investors is changing the behaviour of polluting firms in terms of reforming. 
The introduction of green investors to the market and their possible impact 
on firms leads to three types of firms; acceptable firms with a clean 
technology, unacceptable firms with polluting technology and reformed 
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firms with polluting technology. There are just two types of technologies 
and in the model of HKZ technologies do not change when a firm 
undergoes a reforming act which is shown as paying a certain cost for 
being acceptable to green investor.  Both, green and neutral investors hold 
acceptable firms. Only neutral investors hold unacceptable firms. It will 
later be seen that reformed firms are only held buy green investors. HKZ 
assume that firms act to maximize their share price. The total number of 
investors is held constant and the impact of various numbers of green 
investors is analysed. This means that neutral investors demand a higher 
expected return to be compensated for holding more firms with polluting 
technology than they want to. Due to the higher expected return of neutral 
investors the share price of polluting firms falls below the share price of 
acceptable firms. It can then be seen that the cost of reforming marks a 
critical variable because if the difference in price exceeds the cost which 
accrue for a polluting firm to reform and become valuable for green 
investors, then some firms will reform. This again will broaden the risk 
sharing opportunities and lower the stock price difference (HKZ). In my 
work I will show how the implementation of a tax-financed subsidy will 
influence the behaviour of investors and firms. Throughout section 2 I 
present the model of HKZ from their paper The Effect of Green Investment 
and Corporate Behaviour. Section 3 presents the extension of the HKZ 
model. The structure of the presented extension model is the same as the 
HKZ model in order to get a better comparison. Within section 4 I compare 
the findings from HKZ with the findings from the extension model.  
 
2.1 Model settings 
Heinkel et al. (2001) assume a one period model in which three categories 
of firms exist. The first category contains acceptable (A) firms, those firms 
satisfy the investing criteria of green investors. The second category 
contains unacceptable firms (U), which only satisfy the investing criteria of 
neutral investors and do not satisfy the criteria of green investors. The 
third category consists of reformed (R) firms, which did not satisfy green 
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investors previously but after taking a certain cost they are now acceptable 
to green investors too. All firms work with the same production technology 
and (U) and (R) firms share a common technology. This means that if a 
firm wants to switch from category (U) to category (R) switching cost 
accrue that make the firm acceptable to green investors but the original 
technology is retained. N is the total number of firms and can be split into 
NA acceptable firms, NU unacceptable firms and NR reformed firms. Firms 
out of category (A) use the clean technology and generate a normally 
distributed cash flow with mean μC and variance  σC2 . Between (A) firms the 
cash flows are perfectly correlated. Firms (U) and (R) use the polluting 
technology; those firms generate a normally distributed cash flow with the 
mean μP and the variance  σ P2 . Again the cash flows are perfectly correlated 
with each other. The covariance between (A) firms, (U) firms and (R) firms 
is σCP. The HKZ model contains a riskless asset in addition to the risky 
production technologies; the rate of return of the riskless asset is 
normalized to zero and in perfect elastic supply. Because of the simplifying 
assumption that the cash flows of (U) and (R) firms are perfectly 
correlated, short selling of shares is prohibited. Borrowing is allowed. 
HKZ assume two types of investors i ∈ {n, g} which differ in their 
tolerance of environmental damage. Green investors (g) do not hold 
shares of unacceptable firms; whereas neutral investors (n) have no 
preferences for one category of firms over the other. The total number of I 
investors contains In neutral investors and Ig green investors. Both types of 
investors exhibit constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and a risk 
tolerance parameter τ.  
The total number of firms N consists of NP firms that use the polluting 
technology and NC firms that use the clean technology. Firms with the 
polluting technology have the opportunity to reduce their environmental 
damage at a certain cost K this means that the firms become reformed. 
Due to the fact that the firm is now a reformed firm it becomes eligible for 
the inclusion into the green investors portfolio selection. HKZ assume that 
reformed firms retain their original risk return characteristics. The number 
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of firms that pay the reforming costs of K is denoted with NR. The total 
number of firms consists then of: NC = NA the originally clean firms that 
have the risk and return σC and μC; firms NU the unacceptable and 
polluting firms with the risk and return σP and μP, and further the reformed 
firms NR that have the same risk and return as the polluting firms σP and 
μP. HKZ now divide the total number of firms by technologies as  
 N = NC + N P
 Further the firms are classified by their acceptability to green investors that 
gives  
 N = N A + NU + N R
 Acceptable firms do not change their production technology, which gives 
 NC = N A and N P = NU + N R  
 
The utility functions are given by the combination of CARA and normally 
distributed cash flows 
(1)  
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(2) 
  
Ug = xgAμC + xgRμP − xgA
2 σC2 + xgR2 σ P2 + 2xgA xgRσCP
2τ
− (xgA − ωgA )PA − (xgR − ωgR )PR
 
 
 
Where xik represents the number of shares of firms of category k (k = A, U, 
R) held by a type I investor, Pk is the price per share of a firm of category k 
and ωik is the endowment of shares in firms of category k of a type i 
investor. 
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Investors of type In choose between acceptable and unacceptable firms. 
Due to the same risk-return characteristics between unacceptable and 
reformed firms and the higher share price of reformed firms, it is not 
optimal for neutral investors to hold reformed firms. Unacceptable firms will 
only invest K to become reformed firms if the share price subsequent to 
the investment needed, exceeds that of unacceptable firms by the amount 
K (HKZ, 2001). There for, neutral investors optimize their utility with 
respect to xnA and xnU. Setting xnR = 0 reflects the short selling restriction 
which prohibits neutral investors from gaining an unlimited arbitrage profit 
due to the fact that reformed firms retain their technology. HKZ point out 
that the unlimited arbitrage profits are due to the fact that in equilibrium the 
price for reformed firms is higher than the price for unacceptable firms. In a 
model with reformed firms assuming the clean technology, no short selling 
restriction is required (HKZ, 2001). HKZ get the first order condition for 
neutral investors’ optimal portfolio holdings by taking the derivation of Un 
with respect to xnA and xnU. This can be rewritten as 
 
(3) 0)(2 =−−+ ACCPnUCnA Pxx μτσσ  
 
(4) 0)(2 =−−+ UPPnUCPnA Pxx μτσσ  
 
HKZ solve now simultaneously to get neutral investors’ optimal portfolio 
holdings, 
(5) ( )[ ],)(2* CPUPPACnA PPx σμσμτ −−−Φ=  
 
(6) ( )[ ],)(2* CPACCUPnU PPx σμσμτ −−−Φ=  
 
Where  222 CPPC σσσ −=Φ  
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Green investors only buy shares from acceptable and from reformed firms 
and therefore optimize over xgA and xgR. The first order conditions for 
green investors are, 
 
(7) 0)(2 =−−+ ACCPgRCgA Pxx μτσσ  
 
(8) 0)(2 =−−+ RPPgRCPgA Pxx μτσσ  
 
Solving simultaneously again yields to green investors’ optimal portfolio 
holdings, 
 
(9) ( )[ ],)(2* CPRPPACgA PPx σμσμτ −−−Φ=  
 
(10) ( )[ ],)(2* CPACCRPgR PPx σμσμτ −−−Φ=  
 
HKZ derive the equilibrium share prices by substituting the optimal 
portfolio holdings into the following market clearing conditions. 
 
(11) CAgAgnAn NNXIXI ==+ **  
 
(12)  UnUn NxI =*  
 
(13)    Ig xgR
* = N R  
 
The results from the substitution provide the equilibrium share prices 
shown in equations (14), (15) and (16). 
 
(14) [ ],1 2 CPPCCCA NNIP σστμ +−=  
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HKZ note that the price of an acceptable firm PA is independent of the 
number of green investors, Ig. This can be verified if by taking the total 
derivative of the first market clearing condition in equation (11) through 
equation (13) with respect to Ig. If we look on equation (12), which is NU = 
NP - NR, we can see that the change in demand by investor n for 
unacceptable firms must equal, with opposite signs, the change in demand 
by investor g for reformed firms. Taking a look at the equilibrium it shows 
that the change in the demand function for unacceptable firms by investor 
n is equal to the change in the demand by investor g for reformed firms. In 
the case of an acceptable firm, the demand functions of investors’ n and g 
change with the price in the same way. The price of an acceptable firm 
must remain unchanged to balance the change in demand of acceptable 
firms held by investors’ n and g. HKZ continue now to look at the optimal 
corporate acceptability choice. To get the number of reformed firms, NR, 
by taking into account that the number of unacceptable firms that can get 
reformed by paying the price K, will either be zero or adjust until the price 
of reformed firms is equal to the price of an unacceptable firm plus the 
reforming costs K. This can be written as, PR = PU + K. If we solve this 
equation now for NR we get, 
 
(17) .(,0max
2
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
Φ−−=
C
nC
g
R KINNI
I
N
στ   
 
HKZ now define a crucial variable, *gI , which is the number of green 
investors that apply ethical screens that is required to induce the first 
unacceptable firms to reform and become attractive to green investors. 
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This crucial variable depends on the number of firms acceptable, the risk 
tolerance of investors and the covariance between the cash flows 
produced by the two technologies the cost of becoming reformed. In the 
basic model *gI  is defined as the value of Ig at which NR becomes positive 
in equation (17). This can be written as, 
 
(18)   Ig
* : N R > 0 for Ig > Ig*  
 
HKZ focus on how the change of the model’s parameters influences the 
number of reformed firms by using comparative statics. They show that NR 
is monotonic in Ig. In equation (17) as Ig goes to zero, also NR does, further 
as dlg +dln = 0 it can be seen that NR goes to N – NC as Ig goes to I. HKZ 
take now the total derivative of NR with dlg + dln = 0, this yields 
0/ ≥gR dIdN . It emerges that whenever NR is greater then 0, an increase 
in the number of green investors leads to an increase in the number of 
reformed firms. The total number of investors is held constant, thus a 
higher number of green investors means that the number of neutral 
investors who are willing to hold unacceptable firm’s shares is fewer. The 
resulting lower demand for unacceptable firm’s shares leads to a 
downward price pressure that decreases the share value of unacceptable 
firms. This downward pressure now induces more unacceptable firms to 
pay the cost of reforming, K, to become a reformed firm and acceptable for 
green investors. HKZ show now that an increase of the cost of reforming, 
K, in equation (17) leads to fewer unacceptable firms becoming reformed, 
as the downward pressure must be higher. Further the increase in the risk 
tolerance parameter, τ, results in a decrease of the number of reformed 
firms. This is due to the fact that reformed firms increase the diversification 
possibilities for the green investors; this matter is not strong if green 
investors are more risk tolerant. Next HKZ state that the number of 
reformed firms is a concave function of the covariance and the correlation 
between the cash flows of the polluting technology and the clean 
technology that has its unique maximum where the covariance is zero. 
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This can be seen in the special case where the two technologies have the 
same risk-return features and the number of firms of each technology is 
equal. HKZ consider now the case where the correlation is minus one. In 
this case the neutral investors can own all firms without having any risk 
and there are no incentives for unacceptable firms to reform. The case of 
the other extreme, when the cash flows are perfectly positively correlated 
shows that all possible portfolios have the same risk-return features and 
there are no incentives for unacceptable firms to reform as in the case of a 
correlation of minus one. Next HKZ consider the case of a correlation 
between these two extremes, there arise now diversification gains for 
unacceptable firms reforming; these gains increase as the correlation goes 
to zero. At last the number of reforming firms varies with the number of 
originally acceptable firms, which comes clear from equation (17) as the 
number of reformed firms decreases with an increasing number of 
acceptable firms’. Green investors suffer a diversification loss when the 
number of acceptable firms is high from the beginning and the number of 
unacceptable firms is low. As the share price of unacceptable firms is high 
and this in turn provides little incentive for an unacceptable firm to reform. 
If the share price of an unacceptable firm is low they reform to increase 
their share price, for example through a reduction in of their cost of capital.  
 
HKZ state that given expected future cash flows, { },,, PCji ∈μ  a firm’s cost 
of capital  { }RUAkPKi ,,,1/ ∈−μ   is inversely related with its share price PK. 
By substituting the definition of NR given in equation (17) into the 
expression for PR in equation (16) HKZ get 
 
(19) [ ].)(1 2 τσστμ nPCCPCPR KINNNIP −−+−=  
 
HKZ examine the comparative statics of PR with respect to the model 
parameters to determine in which way reformed firm’s cost of capital 
changes with the change of the model parameters. First they find that 
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reformed firm’s cost of capital decreases as the cost of reforming increase. 
This is due to the fact that a larger drop in the cost of capital is required to 
justify the lager reforming costs. HKZ find that more green investors imply 
a higher cost of capital for reformed firms. The number of investors is fixed 
and if the number of green investors is higher this means a lower number 
of neutral investors that leads to a lower price for unacceptable firms. 
When it comes to the equilibrium the price of a reformed firm is equal to 
the price of unacceptable firms plus the cost of reforming K. Thus HKZ 
state that a lower unacceptable firm price implies a lower reformed firm 
price that implies a higher cost of capital for reformed firms and that more 
risk tolerant investors could quite obviously provide a lower cost of capital 
for all firms. Finally HKZ find that the cost of capital for reformed firms is 
monotonically increasing in the covariance between cash flow of the 
polluting technology and the cash flow of the clean technology and that 
decreasing the diversification possibilities between the technologies raises 
all firms’ cost of capital. 
 
2.2 Numerical example 
With the analytical results HKZ provide a number of insights, but they do 
not provide the magnitude of the endogenous variables (HKZ, 2001). To 
give a better understanding for the endogenous variables HKZ calculate 
values for critical variables like *gI the number of green investors required 
forcing the first unacceptable firm to reform. The base case parameters 
that were used in the base case by HKZ are the following, 
 
Technology Parameter: 
Mean Cash Flows:     10== PC μμ  
Standard Deviation of Cash Flows:  10== PC σσ  
Covariance of Cash Flows:    50=CPσ  
Reforming Cost:     5.0=K  
Total Number of Investors:   1=I  
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Total Number of Firms:    1=N  
Number of Firms with Each Technology:  5.0== PC NN  
 
Investor’s parameter: 
 Aggregate Risk Tolerance:    100=τ  
  
The parameters stated above were chosen in this way by HKZ to produce 
reasonable firm costs of capital. Additionally the structure of the variance-
covariance matrix of cash flows was selected by the authors to provide the 
numerical examples with reasonable results for the standard deviation of 
the rate of return. HKZ select three endogenous variables on which they 
want to test the impact of varying the crucial variable *gI , the number of 
green investors required forcing the first unacceptable firm to reform. The 
first endogenous variable is the number of reformed firms, as a 
percentage of the number of originally polluting firms,  N R /(N − NC ). The 
second endogenous variable is the cost of capital of unacceptable firms, 
  (μP / PU ) −1. The third endogenous variable is the cost of capital of 
reformed firms, 1)/( −RP Pμ . HKZ show these effects in 6 graphs.  
 
2.3 Results from the Numerical example 
HKZ show their findings from the numerical example with several graphs 
that provide an insight in the changes that accrue on the three 
endogenous variables through varying the crucial variable *gI . Figure 1 
shows that the critical value of the number of green investors where the 
first polluting firm is induced to reform starts at 25 % of the investors 
population. The axis of abscissas shows percentage of green investors of 
the total population. The axis of ordinates shows the ratio of reformed 
firms to originally polluting firms. This figure has a convex curve that 
indicates that the marginal effect of additional green investors on reformed 
firms is increasing (HKZ, 2001).  
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Source: Heinkel et al. (2001) Figure 1 
 
 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the cost of capital of unacceptable firms and 
reformed firms respectively. The cost of capital of unacceptable firms is 
about 9.5 % where as the cost of capital for reformed firms are only 3.9 % 
in the base case of HKZ.  This large difference in the cost of capital is 
required to induce the first firm to reform (HKZ, 2001).  The axis of 
ordinates in Figure 2 shows the cost of capital of polluting firms and the 
axis of abscissas indicates the percentage of green investors of the total 
investor’s population. The axis of ordinates in figure 3 shows the cost of 
capital of reformed firms and its axis of abscissas shows the number of 
green investors of the total investor’s population. Figure 2 and Figure 3 
further show that the higher the number of green investors the higher the 
cost of capital for polluting firms and for reformed firms. As HKZ note fewer 
neutral investors results in a lower price for unacceptable firms and thus 
for reformed firms as well, pushing up both firms’ costs of capital.  
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Source: Heinkel et al. (2001) Figure 2 
 
 
 
Source: Heinkel et al. (2001) Figure 3 
 Page 15 
 
In figure 4 HKZ show how varying the reforming costs affects the number 
of reformed firms. The autors look at three different leves of reforming 
costs, first K = 0, 1, second K = 0, 3 and at last K = 1. The axis of 
ordinates shows the ratio of reformed firms to originally polluting firms; the 
axis of abscissas shows the number of green investors as a percentage of 
the total investor’s population. At reforming costs of K = 0, 1 the critical 
variable *gI  is zero. By switching the cost of reforming to K = 1 the high 
pressure of the increased reforming costs prevents unacceptable firms to 
undertake reforming until the number of green investors has reached 60 % 
of the total number of investors. By comparing figure 2 and figure 3 it can 
be seen that the cost of capital of unreformed firms is more then doubled 
the cost of capital of reformed firms.  
 
Source: Heinkel et al. (2001) Figure 4 
HKZ show in Figure 5 how the number of originally acceptable firms, NC, 
affects the number of reformed firms. The axis of abscissas shows the 
percentage of green investors of the total population. The axis of ordinates 
shows the ratio of reformed firms to originally polluting firms. Assuming 
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that there would be no green investors and, P and C technologies would 
have the same risk and return features, and that firms would be able to 
select their technology then 50 % of firms would choose the green 
technology. The states of NC = 0, 25 and NC = 0, 75 are also shown in 
Figure 5. HKZ interpret the NC here as the proportions of all firms that 
green investors find acceptable for their investment before they start to 
restrict their investment. Further this graph indicates that no unacceptable 
firm will reform until the number of green investors has reached 60 % if 
investors consider 75 % of all firms to be acceptable and 25 % not 
acceptable.  
 
Source: Heinkel et al. (2001) Figure 5 
 
So far HKZ have shown the cost of capital of unacceptable firms and 
those of acceptable firms. In a simple setting where all firms face the same 
investment opportunity set HKZ state that the weighted average cost of 
capital determines the total level of investment in the economy. The 
(WACC) weighted average cost of capital is: 
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WACC = NC μCPA + N R
μP
PR
+ NU μPPU −1 
 
HKZ show in Figure 6 the WACC and how it varies with Ig for three 
different settings of NC. The axis of abscissas shows the percentage of 
green investors of the total population. The axis of ordinates shows the 
WACC. In section III of their paper the authors indicate that if the cost of 
reforming K is bigger than zero *gI  is also bigger than zero. This implies 
that if Ig = 0, both NR and dNR / dIg are zero, so at Ig = 0, NU  = NP. HKZ use 
this to show the derivative of the WACC with respect to Ig, at Ig = 0, 
changes only due to a change in PU. The price of acceptable firms PA as 
well as the number of reformed firms NR stays unchanged if NC and NU are 
constant because both green and neutral investors hold acceptable firms. 
Now HKZ let Ig increase from zero which means that the risk sharing 
opportunities are decreasing because green investors do not buy 
unacceptable firms which in turn decreases the price of unacceptable 
firms PU.  
This implies that the WACC increases with Ig, at Ig = 0. At Ig = 1 all 
polluting firms have become reformed so that the third term in the WACC 
equation,  NU μP / PU( ), becomes zero. At this point PR at Ig = 1 equals PU 
at Ig = 0 because all investors are willing to buy all available firms. Thus 
the WACC at Ig = 0 equals the WACC at Ig = 1. At last HKZ indicate why 
the curves for NC = 0, 50 and NC = 0, 75 are different from NC = 0, 25 in 
Figure 6.  
Given a large number for NC (0, 75), *gI is also large, thus there must be a 
higher number of green investors before the first unacceptable firms 
becomes reformed. The only effect of increasing Ig is that PU becomes 
lower; this in turn causes the WACC to increase at an increasing rate. This 
increase can be reduced for Ig > *gI  because in this case when PU is 
decreasing, firms are now willing to switch but through this ease the effect 
of the worsening risk sharing. Thus the WACC is a convex curve for Ig < 
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*
gI  but becomes a concave curve after that point. The curve for NC = 0.25 
also has the same WACC levels at Ig = 0 and Ig = 1. 
 
 
Source: Heinkel et al. (2001) Figure 6 
 
 
3 Extension of the HKZ model 
In this section I present the model extension to the original HKZ model. 
The basic intention to extend the HKZ model was to find if it is possible to 
increase the number of reformed firms without relying on the number of 
green investors. The basic approach to reach this goal is the 
implementation of a state subsidy, which will be financed via a capital gain 
tax.  
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HKZ indicate in their paper that social investing can impact firms’ 
environmental and ethical behaviour. It becomes quite clear in their 
findings that the population that uses exclusionary investment screens to 
boycott socially and environmentally irresponsible firms determines the 
number of reformed firms. The findings of the analytical and numerical 
calculations show that roughly 25 % of the total investor’s population have 
to be green investors to overcome the cost of reforming firms bear in order 
to reform. HKZ also present empirical findings that indicate that in 2001 
only 10 % of investable funds are invested socially and environmentally 
responsible. HKZ state that with their model settings a 10 % fraction of 
green investors does not impact firm’s behaviour but increases the cost of 
capital in the overall economy. Based on the basic settings of the HKZ 
model, their findings and the empirical evidence that in 2008 12 % of 
investable funds where invested socially and environmentally responsible 
(EUROSIF Report, 2008), the aim of this paper is to survey how the 25 % 
of green investors can be lowered and how firms can be encouraged to 
reform earlier anyway. My approach is based on two basic assumptions 
that will be added to the HKZ model in order to survey the possible 
changes. 
 
3.1 General model assumptions 
HKZ show by varying reforming cost variable K that this has a significant 
influence on firm’s decision policy. HKZ vary the cost of reforming K by 
using three different values for this variable K = 0, 1; K = 0, 5 and K = 1. In 
order to overcome the dependency of green investors in the HKZ model I 
implement a mechanism that overcomes this interconnection.  In this 
subsection I will present the assumptions that compose the model 
extension of the HKZ model.  
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3.2 First assumption 
The first assumption of the extended model will be a new institution. 
Originally HKZ use firms, acceptable and unacceptable, and the total 
investor population. Additionally to these settings a government or state 
institution is added to the model. The purpose of the government is to 
impose a capital gains tax. For simplicity this tax will be collected from all 
investor’s neutral and green, in order to avoid equal treatment issues. I 
further assume that this introduced government does not bear any 
administrational cost for the collection of the tax and the distribution of the 
subsidy. This means that the tax is distributed directly to firms that want to 
become reformed. In section 3.8 I will in detail look at the restriction where 
the tax produce only such funds that are needed to provide a definite 
amount of the subsidy. 
 
3.3 Second assumption 
The second assumption is that this institution simultaneously introduces a 
subsidy program to encourage firms to become reformed. This program is 
financed directly with the capital gain tax revenues. In the original HKZ 
model firms have to pay reforming costs of K in order to become reformed 
and be attractive to green investors. In the extension model, firms still 
have to pay reforming cost but parts of these costs are borne by the 
government through the funding program. Investors have to deal now with 
the presence of a capital gain tax. This fact will be incorporated in their 
utility function in order to reflect the changes in investor’s utility. Further 
firms will not have the same pressure on their share price if they become 
reformed as they have in the original model. In section 3.4 it will be shown 
analytically how the capital gain tax is incorporated into the utility functions 
of neutral and green investors and how this will influence the corporate 
behaviour of firms. The structure of the analytical calculations is the same 
as in HKZ. 
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3.4 Analytical survey 
The original utility function of neutral Investors in HKZ is 
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The original utility function of green Investors in HKZ is 
 
(21) 
  
Ug = xgAμC + xgRμP − xgA
2 σC2 + xgR2 σ P2 + 2xgA xgRσCP
2τ
− (xgA − ωgA )PA − (xgR − ωgR )PR
 
 
HKZ derive the optimal portfolio choices of neutral and green investors by 
taking the derivative of the utility function with respect to the corresponding 
xn and xg, and solving these equations simultaneously. In order to get the 
optimal portfolio choices under the assumption of a capital gains tax it is 
necessary to adjust the utility functions of all investors. It is important to do 
so in order to reflect the changes in utility due to the capital gain tax 
investors have to pay in the extended model.  
 
The new utility function of neutral investors adjusted by the capital gain tax 
is  
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(22)
  
Un = xnAμC + (xnU + xnR )μP
− xnA
2 σC2 + (xnU + xnR )2σ P2 + 2xnA( xnU + xnR )σCP
2τ
− (xnA − ωnA )PA − ( xnU − ωnU )PU − ( xnR − ωnR )PR
− (xnAμC − xnAPA )T − (xnU μP − xnU PU )T − (xnRμP − xnR PR )T
 
 
The last line in the utility function reflects the tax burden neutral Investors 
bear. The tax to be paid is calculated by subtracting the value of the 
shares from the value of the expected return and multiplying it by the tax. 
The assumption that short selling is restricted, made by HKZ in order to 
prevent possible unlimited arbitrage gains, also applies in this case.  
 
The new utility function of green investors adjusted by the capital gains tax 
is  
 
(23) 
  
Ug = xgAμC + xgRμP − xgA
2 σC2 + xgR2 σ P2 + 2xgA xgRσCP
2τ
− (xgA − ωgA )PA − ( xgR − ωgR )PR
− (xgAμC − xgAPA )T − (xgRμP − xgR PR )T
 
 
The last line in the utility function reflects the tax burden green investors 
bear. The tax to be paid is calculated by subtracting the value of the 
shares from the value of the expected return and multiplying it by the tax.  
Taking into account the short selling restriction from the original model of 
HKZ neutral investors optimize their portfolio holdings by taking the 
derivative of Un with respect to xnA and xnU and set xnR=0. 
 
Doing so leads to the first order conditions for neutral investors. 
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(25)   xnAσCP + xnUσ P2 − τ (μP − PU ) − (μP − PU )T[ ] = 0  
 
Solving these equations simultaneously provides the neutral investors’ 
optimal portfolio holdings. Further I use the same subsumption as HKZ  
 
  Φ = σC2σ P2 − σCP2  
 
(26) 
  
xnA
* = τΦ (μC − PA ) − (μC − PA )T[ ]σ P2 − (μP − PU ) − (μP − PU )T[ ]σCP{ } 
 
(27) 
  
xnU
* = τΦ (μP − PU ) − (μP − PU )T[ ]σC2 − (μC − PA ) − (μC − PA )T[ ]σCP{ } 
 
By taking the derivative of green investor’s utility function with respect to 
xnA and xgR I get the first order conditions for green investors’ optimal 
portfolio holdings 
 
(28)   xgAσC2 + xgRσCP − τ (μC − PA ) − (μC − PA )T[ ] = 0  
 
(29)   xgAσCP + xgRσ P2 − τ (μP − PR ) − (μP − PR )T[ ] = 0  
 
Solving these equations simultaneously provides the green investors’ 
optimal portfolio holdings.  
 
  Φ = σC2σ P2 − σCP2  
 
(30) 
  
xgA
* = τΦ (μC − PA ) − (μC − PA )T[ ]σ P2 − (μP − PR ) − (μP − PR )T[ ]σCP{ } 
 
(31) 
  
xgR
* = τΦ (μP − PR ) − (μP − PR )T[ ]σC2 − (μC − PA ) − (μC − PA )T[ ]σCP{ } 
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By using the same market clearing conditions as HKZ I get the new 
equilibrium prices by substituting the new tax adjusted portfolio holdings 
into these conditions. The purpose of using the same market clearing 
conditions as HKZ is to increase the comparability to the HKZ model. The 
intermediate steps to this calculation can be found in the Appendix.  
 
(32)   InxnA
* + Ig xgA* = N A = NC  
 
(33)    InxnU
* = NU  
 
(34)    Ig xgR
* = N R  
 
As HKZ mention that in equilibrium the price for reformed firms is higher 
than the price for unacceptable firms, and both firms have the same risk 
and return characteristics, a short selling restriction is binding for neutral 
investors in this case in order to prevent them from unlimited arbitrage 
profits. In a model where reformed firms change their technology from 
polluting to clean this restriction will not be required as HKZ state in their 
paper. Urs von Arx in his working paper Principle guided investing: The 
use of negative screens and its implications for green investors (05/45) 
has surveyed the implications a change of technology will have. He sets 
up a model where firms switch to a clean technology by investing in 
abatement and therefore a change not only in the expected return but also 
in risk characteristics is assumed. He introduces a new asset class with 
this change in the risk and return characteristics. As a side effect an 
additional diversification effect occurs. This additional diversification effect 
can have, under certain conditions, a big impact on the occurrence of 
switches: For example when abatement costs are relatively low and only a 
few green investors are present, neutral investors will invest in shares of 
clean firms, not because of principle guided beliefs, but for risk reduction 
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reasons (Urs von Arx, 2005). In my work I will not include such a model 
that deals with a change in technology for firms that want to reform.  
 
The new resulting equilibrium prices based on the basic assumptions of 
HKZ and adjusted by the capital gains tax are 
 
(35)  
  
PA = μC − 1(1− T )
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
1
Iτ
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ σC
2 N A + σCP N P[ ], 
 
(36) 
  
PU = μP − 1(1− T )
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
1
Iτ
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ σCP NC + σ P
2 NU + NU IgIn
Φ
σC2
+ N R σCP
2
σC2
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ , 
 
(37) 
  
PR = μP − 1(1− T )
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
1
Iτ
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ σCP NC + NU
σCP2
σC2
+ N Rσ P2 + N R IgIn
Φ
σC2
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ , 
 
As HKZ state in their work also here that in equation (36) the price for an 
acceptable firm, PA, is independent of the number of green investors. HKZ 
state that the number of unacceptable firms that pay to become reformed 
either will be zero or will adjust until the price of reformed firms is equal to 
the price of unacceptable firms plus the cost of becoming reformed, K. 
That is  
 
(38) PR = PU + K 
 
Recalling the second assumption from section 3.3 of the extended model 
that the government launches a program to subsidies the cost of reforming 
with a tax financed subsidy, equation (38) can be rewritten as 
 
(39) PR = PU + (K-dK) 
 
Where dK denotes the tax-financed subsidy 
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(40) 
  
dK = T NC μC − PA( )+ NU μP − PU( )+ NR μP − PR( )[ ],  
 
The fact that dK is not only depending on the gain but also on the number 
of firms acceptable, unacceptable and reformed, secures that the 
collection of the tax is not dependent on the distribution of the neutral and 
green investors. Like HKZ, the equality equation (39) will be solved for NR. 
With respect to the assumptions made in sections 3.1 and 3.2 the 
incorporation of the tax term into the utility function and the variable dK 
into equation (39), solving for NR leads to a quadratic equation as solution 
for NR. The complete mathematical calculus can be found in the Appendix. 
The fact that NR cannot be negative leaves only one solution for the 
quadratic equation. Due to the fact that the original equation is very long, I 
have chosen to replace the last term of the original equation (41) with the 
Greek letter Λ.  
 
(41) 
  
N R =
−2 1+ T( N − NC )[ ] ± 2(1+ T (N − NC ))[ ]2 − 4* 2* T * Λ
2* 2* T
 
 
 
 (42) 
  
Λ = K(1− T )Inτ σC
2
φ − (N − NC )(1+ T( N − NC )) −
In
I
σC2
φ T NC
2σC2 + 2NC (N − NC )σCP + ( N − NC )2σ P2[ ]
 
  
The main driver for the number of reformed firms is now the variable T 
representing the capital gain tax and thereby indirectly dK, the subsidy.  
  
3.5 Analytical differences of HKZ and the extended model 
In section 3.1 and 3.2 I state the prime assumptions as extension of the 
HKZ model. The basic idea was how to decrease the number of green 
investors but simultaneously hold the number of reforming firms constant 
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or even increase it. HKZ derive the optimal portfolio choices of neutral and 
green investors by taking the derivative of the utility function with respect 
to the corresponding xn and xg, and solving these equations 
simultaneously. In order to get the optimal portfolio choices under the 
assumption of a capital gain tax it was necessary to adjust the utility 
functions of all investors. It is important to do so in order to reflect the 
changes in utility due to the capital gains tax. This is the point in the 
extension where the first analytical difference appears.  Due to this change 
every following analytical step is changed. We see this primarily in 
equation (24) where neutral investors, due to the incorporation of the tax in 
the utility function, first order condition is extended by the tax term T.  
In the following the optimal portfolio choice equations also reflect the 
investor’s change in utility due to the newly introduced tax.  
Using the same market clearing conditions like HKZ provides 
comparability to the original model. This also implies that the main 
assumptions of HKZ stay untouched, except the extension. Following the 
analytical calculation to equation (39) we come to the incorporation of the 
tax financed subsidy. The variable dK is presented in equation (40). This 
marks the biggest difference in the analytical calculation compared to 
HKZ. Unlike HKZ I get a quadratic equation as solution for NR. The full 
calculus for NR can be found in the Appendix. In the main part I presented 
the solution for NR, which is already solved analytically with the basic 
formula for quadratic equations (see Appendix).  
HKZ define a variable of particular interest Ig*, as the value of Ig at which 
NR becomes positive in their equation for NR.  
Recalling the assumption made in the extended model and the 
mathematical calculus in section 3.4, reveals that in this model the 
variable NR is primarily dependent on the variable T. It can be seen in 
equation (41) that T can be very small but has to be positive in order to get 
a solution for NR. In the original HKZ model, the number of green investors 
was the most important variable to define when the first firm will become 
reformed.  
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Further HKZ showed that varying the cost of reforming K has a significant 
importance for the number of firms that choose to switch from 
unacceptable to reform in order to be attractive to green investors. The 
pressure that green investors put on the market through their increase in 
presence is a main driving factor in the HKZ findings. Through equation 
(41) it comes clear that the presence of green investors is not that 
important anymore in order to get the first firm to switch. The fact that the 
variable K is lowered by tax-financed subsidy also explains the reduction 
of the importance of green investors. The two driving factors are the tax on 
capital gains T and the reforming subsidy dK. HKZ state in their 
comparative statics that NR is monotonic in Ig, this does not hold for the 
model extension. In the extension model NR is already positive in the case 
of a 25 % tax even when there are no green investors present, Ig is zero. 
HKZ suggest that a fraction of the investment that is done in order to 
reform would have been done also in the absence of green investors as 
part of normal modernizing of capital expenditure. The favourable 
environment, which the tax-financed subsidy creates, is a possible 
explanation for this but this issue will not be further examined in this work. 
Further the number of reformed firms is not going to N - NC when Ig goes 
to I. Taking into account a variation of NC, as HKZ, the number of reformed 
firms also varies in the extension model. 
 
3.6 Numerical example 
In order to show how the changes in the original HKZ model affect the 
results I will present a numerical example in this section. The values that I 
have chosen are the same that HKZ used in their paper. Additionally to the 
basic settings of the HKZ numerical example I added the tax variable T. 
The values that HKZ used for their numerical example are assumed to be 
total values and percentage values. For example taking the variable 
  N = 1 does not mean that there is only one firm in the in this model it 
means that   N  accounts for the total of 100% and setting 5.0== PC NN  
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means that 50 % are clean and 50 % are polluting firms. Now taking the 
variable 5.0=K  does not mean that the cost of reforming are 50 % it can 
be seen as a total value (for example a monetary value of 0, 5 €). This 
comes clear in the assumptions of HKZ. They authors state that if the cost 
of capital overcome the cost of reforming then polluting firms will become 
socially responsible because of exclusionary ethical investing. Since the 
costs of capital are given in HKZ as a percentage value the cost of 
reforming K must be a total monetary value.  HKZ assume a fixed cost of 
reforming a polluting technology of 5 % of the expected cash flow of the 
firm. Since the expected cash flow of each firm is  μP = 10, 5 % of the 
cash flow has to be paid by each firm; this gives a total value of 0, 5. Due 
to the fact that in the scaling of the numerical example HKZ operates with 
percentage values, it comes clear that each firm has to pay 5.0=K . HKZ 
choose these parameters to produce reasonable results for their model. In 
section 3.8 I assume more fine scaled numbers to show how a variable tax 
affects the model. 
 
 
Parameters used in the numerical example: 
 
Technology Parameter: 
Mean Cash Flows:     10== PC μμ  
Standard Deviation of Cash Flows:  10== PC σσ  
Covariance of Cash Flows:    50=CPσ  
Reforming Cost:     5.0=K  
Total Number of Investors:   1=I  
Total Number of Firms:    1=N  
Number of Firms with Each Technology:  5.0== PC NN  
 
Investor’s parameter: 
 Aggregate Risk Tolerance:    100=τ  
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Capital Gain Tax:       T = 25 % 
 
In the following section, I will present the findings form the numerical 
example. The value of the tax was chosen primarily 25 % for simplicity 
reasons and due to the fact that the capital gains tax in Austria is 25 %. 
For simplicity reasons I do not differentiate between normal capital gains 
and dividend income as the Austrian government does. The value of the 
tax will be varied (25% / 12% / 5% / 1%) throughout the numerical 
example to see the impact of this variable in the model. In the various 
figures it can be seen that firms would already reform without the presence 
of green investors. In the HKZ assumptions green investor buy reformed 
firms but neutral investor do not buy reformed firms. In order to make it 
possible for them to buy reformed firms, the portfolio holdings and the 
market clearing conditions need to be adjusted. These modifications are 
beyond the scope of this work and will not be worked out. After the general 
comparison with HKZ I look more detailed on variable tax rates. This 
detailed observation will be done in section 3.8.    
 
3.7 Results and comparison of the numerical example 
HKZ choose three endogenous variables, on which they test the effect of 
varying the crucial and also endogenous variable *gI , the number of green 
investors required forcing the first unacceptable firm to reform. The first 
endogenous variable is the number of reformed firms, as a percentage of 
the number of originally polluting firms,  N R /(N − NC ). The second 
endogenous variable is the cost of capital of unacceptable firms; 
  (μP / PU ) −1 the third endogenous variable is the cost of capital of reformed 
firms, 1)/( −RP Pμ . In my comparison I will survey the same endogenous 
variables and how they change with the introduction of a tax financed 
subsidy for unacceptable firms. It will be seen that this lowers reforming 
costs and increases the number of reformed firms independently of the 
number of green investors. Figure 7 shows the number of reformed firms 
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as a percentage of the number of originally unacceptable firms for 4 
different settings of T, (25 / 12 / 5 / 1).  
 
Figure 7: Lukas Schirnhofer 2010 
 
The axis of ordinates in Figure 7 indicates the number of reformed firms as 
a percentage of the number of originally unacceptable firms; the axis of 
abscissas indicates the percentage of green investors of the total investor 
population. Figure 7 shows that a 25 % and a 12 % tax already leads to a 
higher number of reformed firms independently from the number of green 
investors. In the case of a 5 % tax the percentage of green investors 
needed for the first firm to reform is some 13 % from the total investor’s 
population. A 1 % tax gives results that are close to the findings of HKZ for 
25 % of green investors.  
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Figure 8 shows the cost of capital of unacceptable firms as a function of 
the number of green investors.  
 
Figure 8: Lukas Schirnhofer 2010 
 
In Figure 8 the axis of ordinates indicates the cost of capital of 
unacceptable firms, the axis of abscissas indicates the percentage of 
green investors of the total investor’s population. Figure 8 indicates that 
the lower T the lower is the cost of capital of unacceptable firms. This is a 
significant outcome of the implementation of the tax into the utility function 
of neutral and green investors. The lower the tax, the lower the burden on 
investors utility, the lower the demand of investors to get higher gains in 
order to compensate for the tax loss. Figure 9 shows the cost of capital of 
reformed firms. The cost of capital compared with HKZ is on average 
higher than in the HKZ model; see Figure 2 in section 2.3.  
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Figure 9: Lukas Schirnhofer 2010   
 
In Figure 9 the axis of abscissas shows percentage of green investors of 
the total investor’s population, the axis of ordinates indicates the cost of 
capital of reformed firms. The cost of capital of reformed firms does not 
increase as rapidly as the cost of capital for polluting firms. This is due to 
the fact that the government subsidises the cost of reforming. If we take 
the blue line, standing for a 25 % capital gain tax we see that in Figure 9 
the cost of capital of reformed firms stays below 10 % until around 50 % of 
investors are green compared to the costs of capital of unacceptable firms, 
which are at 50 percent green investors already 12 %. Here we also see 
as in Figure 8 that on average the costs of capital are higher as in the HKZ 
paper. Again this proves that investors hand over the burden form the tax 
to the firms, which have to compensate investors with higher returns (see 
Figure 3 in section 2.3). 
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Figure 10 and 11 show how varying the reforming costs K affect the 
number of reformed firms. I choose the same numbers for K as HKZ do, K 
= 1; K = 0, 5 and K = 0, 1, but only show the outcomes of K = 1 and K = 0, 
1 the case of K = 0, 5 is already presented in Figure 7.  The axis of 
ordinates in Figure 10 indicates the number of reformed firms as a 
percentage of the number of originally acceptable firms, the axis of 
abscissas indicates the percentage of green investors of the total 
investor’s population. Figure 10 highlights the values for NR / (N-NC) under 
the assumption that unacceptable firms have to pay K = 1 in order to 
become reformed.  
 
Figure 10: Lukas Schirnhofer 2010   
 
It becomes clear that the lower the tax burden, the higher the number of 
investors that is needed to induce the first unacceptable firm to become 
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reformed. In the setting with K = 0, 5 in Figure 7 it can be seen that 
starting with a tax rate of 5 % the presence of green investors becomes 
important again. Whereas with K = 1 the presence of green investors is 
already important with a high tax rate of 25 %. Compared to HKZ for a 25 
% tax and K = 1 the percentage of green investors is already higher in my 
model. 
Figure 11 shows the values for NR / (N-NC) under the assumption that 
unacceptable firms have to pay K = 0, 1 in order to become reformed. The 
axis of ordinates in Figure 11 indicates the number of reformed firms as a 
percentage of the number of originally acceptable firms, the axis of 
abscissas indicates the percentage of green investors of the total 
investor’s population 
 
 
Figure 11: Lukas Schirnhofer 2010   
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Figure 11 clearly shows that when reform costs are considerably low, the 
capital gain tax of 25 % has a negative impact on the number of reformed 
firms as a percentage of originally acceptable firms. Starting with zero 
green investors and 12 % tax, around 48 % of all firms become reformed 
immediately in this case but unacceptable firms stay thereafter indifferent 
on reforming or staying unreformed with a growing number of green 
investors. The number of reformed firms stays constant and the presence 
of green investors has no impact for this setting. In contrast to the findings 
for T = 25 % and T = 12 %, for the number of reformed firms at T = 5 % 
and T = 1 %, green investors presence does have an impact. The findings 
show that the percentage of reformed firms is increasing with the number 
of green investors.  
Figure 12 shows the effect that the original number of acceptable firms 
has on the number of reformed firms. Like HKZ I chose the following 
starting values for NC. NC = 0, 25; NC = 0, 50 and NC = 0, 75. The curve for 
NC = 0, 50 can be found in Figure 7, for NC = 0, 50 is the basic setting like 
in HKZ. The axis of ordinates in figure 12 indicates the number of 
reformed firms as a percentage of the number of originally acceptable 
firms, the axis of abscissas indicates the percentage of green investors of 
the total investor’s population. In Figure 12 NC = 0, 25. 
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Figure 12: Lukas Schirnhofer 2010 
Due to the subsidy effect firms switch before the first green investor is 
present. The impact of a low NC = 0, 25 can be seen in the cost of capital 
where unacceptable firms have roughly 9 % and reformed firms have 7 % 
when no green investor is present. Compared to Figure 7 where firms do 
not switch in all 4-tax-rate settings without any green investor being 
present. With NC = 0, 50 cost of capital of unacceptable firms are 9, 5 % 
and the cost of capital of reformed firms are 6, 8 % without any green 
investor being present and a tax rate of 25 %.  
Figure 13 indicates the effect that the original number of acceptable firms 
has on the number of reformed firms for NC = 0, 75. The axis of ordinates 
in Figure 13 shows the number of reformed firms as a percentage of the 
number of originally acceptable firms, the axis of abscissas the percentage 
of green investors of the total investors population.  
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Figure 13: Lukas Schirnhofer 2010 
At T = 25 % no green investors are needed to induce unacceptable firms 
to reform. Already roughly 8 percent of unacceptable firms would reform 
with zero green investors present. Lowering the tax rate when NC = 0, 75 
leads to the case where green investors have an impact again on the 
reforming of firms.   
Following the structure of HKZ, extended with my assumption from section 
3.2 and 3.3, I have explored the cost of capital of individual firms and the 
number of reformed firms as a percentage of the number of originally 
acceptable firms under the assumption of a tax financed subsidy. Further, 
like HKZ I am going to look at the total cost of capital of all firms.  This 
weighted average cost of capital gives insight in the amount of investment 
in the overall economy (HKZ, 2001). The so-called WACC has the same 
formula as in the original paper of HKZ. This is due to the fact that the tax-
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financed subsidy is already incorporated in the numbers that are used for 
the calculation of the WACC.  
 
(43) 
  
WACC = NC μCPA + N R
μP
PR
+ NU μPPU −1 
 
Figure 14, 15 and 16 show the weighted average cost of capital for three 
different starting values of NC respectively (NC = 0, 25; NC = 0, 50; NC = 0, 
75). The axis of ordinates in Figure 14, 15 and 16 show the weighted 
average cost of capital of the overall economy, the axis of abscissas the 
percentage of green investors of the total investors population, 
respectively.  
 
Figure 14: Lukas Schirnhofer 2010   
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As can be seen in Figure 14 the WACC is rising with the number of green 
investors introduces into the market and this already from the beginning, 
at a low starting value for originally acceptable firms; NC = 0, 25. This 
phenomenon is due to the fact that neutral investors demand a higher 
return to be compensated for the tax-loss. This demand pressure drives 
the prices for unacceptable firms down and increases the individual cost of 
capital for the firm. In the NC = 0, 25 case neutral investors count for the lot 
of the tax earnings. Figure 15 shows the WACC values with NC = 0, 50. 
 
 
Figure 15: Lukas Schirnhofer 2010   
 
 
 Page 41 
Compared to Figure 14 it can be seen that the WACC grows only by a 
small ratio until around 60 % percent of green investors are in the market. 
Figure 16 shows the WACC numbers for NC = 0, 75. 
 
 
Figure 16: Lukas Schirnhofer 2010   
 
 
As in Figure 15 the WACC rises only with a low rate, compared to figure 
15 the jump due to the presence of high percentage of green investor’s 
shifts back to 80 % Ig. In the extended model the WACC is considerably 
higher than in the original model of HKZ as can be seen in Figures 14, 15 
and 16. In the HKZ model the authors state that with an increasing Ig the 
risk sharing opportunities are lessened because of the green investors 
boycott of unacceptable firms and so PU decreases, which implies that the 
WACC increases with Ig at Ig =0. In my model the increase of the WACC 
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and the on average higher WACC as to HKZ is due to the same causation 
with the major difference that not Ig is the driving factor. The fact that due 
to the tax financed subsidies most of the firms become reformed already 
before the presence of green investors also lowers the risk sharing 
opportunities for neutral investors and therefore decreases PU which again 
implies an increasing WACC.  
3.8 Detailed evaluation of a variable tax 
 
The calculation of Section 3.7 showed that more taxes are earned in all 4-
fixed-tax cases than are distributed as subsidies. HKZ state in their work 
that cost of reforming is an important determinant of green investing. In the 
extended model it comes clear that a fraction of investment is made 
regardless the presence of green investors in the market. HKZ suggest 
that this happens in the normal curse of modernizing capital expenditure. 
In this section I evaluate the impact of a variable tax. The tax rate values 
are chosen individually for each setting in order to show the minimum tax 
rate at which firms switch. Further the range of that tax is set in such a way 
that the tax earned by the government and subsidies spent are equal. 
Thus only as many firms reform as sufficient funds are available. Further I 
compare the findings to the standard setting of HKZ base case of NC = 0, 
5 and K = 0, 5. When high tax rates are introduced, the presence of green 
investors is not important. The former findings show that at a tax rate of 5 
% the presence of green investors gets important again. The detailed 
evaluation with a variable tax shows that at low tax rates between 0, 25 % 
and 9 % the presence of green investors is a significant determinant also 
in the extended model. 
 
First I show that the maximum tax that needs to be collected in order to 
reach the subsidy need is about 9 %. Within the range given in Figure 17 
the taxes earned are equal with the subsidy distributed. Figure 17 shows 
that at 75 % of green investors, the pressure on unacceptable firms is high 
enough in order to decrease the tax but still have enough funds to 
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subsidize firms that want to reform. The axis of ordinates in Figure 17 
shows the variable tax T, the axis of abscissas shows the percentage of 
green investors of the total investor’s population. The uneven curve 
originates in the individual setting of the tax rate in order to find out the 
minimum tax rate for each possible setting.   
 
 
Figure 17: Lukas Schirnhofer 2010  
 
In the case of variable taxes the presence of green investors is important 
again. The introduction of the tax has a positive impact on the number of 
firms that become reformed up to the mark where green investor’s count 
for about 60 % of the investor’s population. At this point the HKZ model is 
more favourable for green investment. The most significant founding in the 
extended model is that polluting firms switch, from unacceptable to 
reformed until a  NR /(N − NC ) ratio of 0.5 where in the HKZ model the 
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  NR /(N − NC ) ratio at 100% green investors is 1. Thus in the extended 
model with 100 % green investors, 25 % of the total firm population remain 
unacceptable where in the HKZ base case all polluting firms become 
reformed. Figure 18 compares the  N R /(N − NC ) ratios of the HKZ and the 
extended model, where EXMO is the curve of the extended model.  The 
axis of ordinates in Figure 18 indicates the number of reformed firms as a 
percentage of the number of originally acceptable firms, the axis of 
abscissas indicates the percentage of green investors of the total 
investor’s population. 
 
 
Figure 18: Lukas Schirnhofer 2010 
 
The difference in the cost of capital of the extended model is nearly zero 
up to 25 % green investors in the market. In Figure 19 it can be seen that 
from 25 % to about 40 % of green investors of the total investor’s 
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population the extended model shows a marginal better cost of capital 
then HKZ.  
Starting at 40 % green investors, the cost of capital of polluting firms 
increase more with a growing number of investors than in the HKZ basic 
model. In Figure 19 the axis of abscissas shows percentage of green 
investors of the total investor’s population, the axis of ordinates indicates 
the cost of capital of unacceptable firms.  
 
 
Figure 19: Lukas Schirnhofer 2010 
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Figure 20: Lukas Schirnhofer 2010   
 
Figure 20 shows the cost of capital of reformed firms. The axis of 
abscissas shows percentage of green investors of the total investor’s 
population, the axis of ordinates indicates the cost of capital of reformed 
firms. The impact of the variable tax rate is only marginal in the cost of 
capital of reformed firms. The costs of capital in the HKZ setting are lower 
then in the extended model. This again reflects the fact that investors 
demand a lower price in the extended model in order to be compensated 
for the loss in utility which in turn increases the pressure on firms and their 
cost of capital.  
Looking at the total cost of capital, the WACC, in the HKZ basic model and 
in the extended model it comes clear that a tax on capital gains combined 
with a subsidy on reforming cost is only beneficial within a short range. 
Figure 21 shows how the WACC increases due to the pressure of a 
decreasing number of neutral investors. 
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Figure 21: Lukas Schirnhofer 2010 
 
 
 
 
The axis of ordinates in Figure 21 shows the weighted average cost of 
capital of the economy, the axis of abscissas shows the percentage of 
green investors of the total investor’s population. The WACC at 25 % of 
green Investors is equal to HKZ. From 25 % until about 48 % green 
investors the WACC in the extended model is lower then the HKZ WACC. 
Above 50 % the WACC in the HKZ basic model decreases again, whereas 
the WACC in the extended model continues to rise. This is due to the fact 
that the pressure on firms still increases, thou the tax decrease, but firms 
do not switch anymore after 25 % of unacceptable firms have switched.  
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4 Conclusions 
The intention of this work was to survey the impact of a capital gain tax 
combined with a subsidy on reforming cost within the basic model setting 
of the  HKZ paper “The effect of green investment on corporate 
behaviour“. 
In order to identify these changes, I extended the basic HKZ model with a 
capital gain tax and a subsidy on reforming cost. In the first step the 
calculus of HKZ had to be modified by the incorporation of the tax into the 
Utility function of HKZ. During the study it becomes clear that this changes 
basically the initial setting in a very crucial way. The biggest difference 
states the equation for the number of reformed firms, which is a linear 
function in HKZ and a quadratic in the extended model. After the 
derivation of the calculus for the extended model I compared the results of 
the numerical example with HKZ. In the first step I chose fixed values for 
the capital gain tax. The outcomes in section 3.7 indicate that a high 
capital gain tax resulting in a high subsidy negate the importance of green 
investors on the switch of unacceptable firms to reformed firms. Only with 
a fixed 5 % and lower capital gain tax green investors gain a significant 
importance again. The costs of capital for fixed tax rates are slightly higher 
than HKZ but steady up to 75 % of green investors compared to a variable 
tax rate.  
In section 3.8 I evaluated the impact of a variable tax rate for each 
possible setting of the investor’s population. The tax rate values are 
chosen individually for each setting in order to show the minimum tax rate 
at which firms switch. Further the range of that tax rate is set in such a 
manner that the tax earned by the government and the subsidy spent is 
equal. The findings of this survey indicate that a variable tax rate is only 
advantageous for a small range of the percentage of green investors of 
the total investor’s population. Thus the costs of capital raise significantly 
more out of this specific range than in the HKZ basic model. Also the 
overall costs of capital are higher before 25 % and after 48 % of green 
investors of the total investor’s population. With a variable tax also the first 
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firm’s switches from unacceptable to reformed firms at 25 % of green 
investors, as in the HKZ setting. From 25 % green investors up to about 
60 % the extended model favours the switch of unacceptable firms 
compared to the HKZ settings. Thereafter the HKZ model encourages 
more firms to switch than the extended model, which stops the switching 
process at about 25 % of reformed firms of the total firm population. This 
fact leaves open space for further research in this direction. With a more 
advanced extended model, which incorporates also a change in the risk 
and return characteristics, and the new asset class approach of Urs von 
Arx, more precise results could be possible. I did not follow this direction 
because this would create a totally new model, which would not be as 
comparable to HKZ as my approach and also exceed the scope of this 
work.  
In general the survey of the extended model indicates that the effect of 
social investing is not as important, in a smaller range, as in the HKZ 
model. This is due to the fact that the introduced tax financed subsidy 
annuls the effect of a growing number of green investors if and only if the 
tax is high enough to produce sufficient funds for the state to provide a 
high subsidy. In the case of a lower Tax and resulting from this a lower 
subsidy the presence of social responsible investing with the presence of 
green investors becomes more important again but not to the same extent 
as in HKZ. This also applies for the variable tax for specific number of 
green investors as indicated above. An even more general conclusion 
from my findings is that two ways exist in order to have more 
environmentally friendly firm’s in other words good corporate behaviour. 
The first way is the more market driven proposal of HKZ for which 
empirical evidence already exists (page 444-4447, HKZ 2001). This 
approach is mainly focused on the social attitude of Investors and their 
ability to influence corporate behaviour through market orientated 
mechanism. The second way is not to rely on the good attitude of 
investors and their will to undergo social responsible screening and 
investment but provide a subsidy program to encourage firms to become 
reformed. For this approach no empirical data exists yet. Taxes on gains 
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do already exist but the collected amount is not yet used to provide 
reforming incentives for polluting firms. This makes also the difference 
form my simple model to reality. I assumed that the government has no 
cost of tax collection and subsidy distribution. In reality also the fact of a 
direct capital gain tax or anything like that is hard to reach in reality. The 
discussion about the Tobin tax (James Tobin, 1978) is now going on for 
more the 30 years but no conclusion has been reached yet. Even though 
politicians do discuss the importance of such a transaction tax more 
intensively due to the financial crisis but no link has been made yet to a 
possible subsidy program.  
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5 Appendix  
(19) PR = PU + (K-dK) 
 
Solved for NR 
  
μP − 1(1− T )
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
1
Iτ
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ σCP NC + NU
σCP2
σC2 + N Rσ P
2 + N R IgIn
Φ
σC2
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ =
μP − 1(1− T )
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
1
Iτ
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ σCP NC + σ P
2 NU + NU IgIn
Φ
σC2 + N R
σCP2
σC2
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ + K −
TNCμC + TNC μC − 1(1− T )
1
Iτ (σC
2 N A + σCP N P )
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ −
TNU μP + TNU μP − 1(1− T )
1
Iτ (σCP NC + σ P
2 NU + NU IgIn
Φ
σC2 + N R
σCP2
σC2 )
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ −
TN RμP + TN R μP − 1(1− T )
1
Iτ (σCP NC + NU
σCP2
σC2 + N Rσ P
2 + N R IgIn
Φ
σC2 )
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
multiply with (1− T )Iτ
 
 
  
−σCP NC − NU σCP
2
σC2 + N Rσ P
2 + N R IgIn
Φ
σC2 =
−σCP NC − σ P2 NU − NU IgIn
Φ
σC2
− N R σCP
2
σC2
+ K(1− T )Iτ −
TNC (σC2 N A + σCP N P ) −
TNU (σCP NC + σ P2 NU + NU IgIn
Φ
σC2 + N R
σCP2
σC2 ) −
TN R (σCP NC + NU σCP
2
σC2
+ N Rσ P2 + N R IgIn
Φ
σC2
)
multiply with σC2
set N A = NC ; NU = N − NC − N R ; N P = N − NC
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−( N − NC − N R )σCP2 − N Rσ P2σC2 − N R IgIn Φ =
− (N − NC − N R )σ P2σC2 − ( N − NC − N R ) IgIn Φ − N RσCP
2 + K(1− T )IτσC2 −
TNC (σC2σ P2 NC + σC2σCP (N − NC )) −
T ( N − NC − N R ) (σCPσC2 NC + σ P2σC2 ( N − NC − N R ) + ( N − NC − N R ) IgIn Φ + N RσCP
2 ) −
TN R (σCPσC2 NC + ( N − NC − N R )σCP2 + N Rσ P2σC2 + N R IgIn Φ
 
 
 
  
N RσCP2 − N Rσ P2σC2 − N R IgIn Φ − N Rσ P
2σC2 − N R IgIn Φ + N RσCP
2 −
TN R (σCPσC2 NC + σ P2σC2 (N − NC − N R ) + (N − NC − N R ) IgIn Φ + N RσCP
2 ) +
TN R (σCPσC2 NC + ( N − NC − N R )σCP2 + N Rσ P2σC2 + N R IgIn Φ) =
(N − NC )σCP2 − ( N − NC )σ P2σC2 − (N − NC ) IgIn Φ + K(1− T )IτσC
2 −
TNC (σCPσC2 NC + σ P2σC2 (N − NC )) −
T( N − NC ) (σCPσC2 NC + σ P2σC2 ( N − NC − N R ) + (N − NC − N R ) IgIn Φ + N RσCP
2 )
 
 
  
−2N RΦ − 2N R IgIn
Φ − TN R (N − NC − N R )σ P2σC2 − TN R ( N − NC − N R ) IgIn Φ − TN R
2σCP2 +
TN R (N − NC − N R )σCP2 + TN R2σ P2σC2 + TN R2 IgIn Φ −
T( N − NC )σ P2σC2 N R − T( N − NC ) IgIn ΦN R + TN R ( N − NC )N RσCP
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+ K(1− T )IτσC2 − TNC2σ P2σC2 − TNC ( N − NC )σC2σCP −
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−2N RΦ IIn
− TN R ( N − NC − N R )Φ − TN R (N − NC − N R ) IgIn
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Φ −
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basic formula for quadratic equations
ax2 + bx + c = 0
x
12
= −b ± b
2 − 4ac
2a
a = 2T
b = 2 1+ T (N − NC )[ ]
c = Λ
Λ = K(1− T )Inτ σC
2
Φ − (N − NC ) 1+ T (N − NC )[ ]−
In
I
σC2
Φ T NC
2σC2 + 2NC (N − NC )σCP + ( N − NC )2σ P2[ ]
N R =
−2 1+ T(N − NC )[ ]± (2 1+ T( N − NC )[ ])2 − 4 * 2 * T * λ
2 * 2 * T
N R ≥ 0
T > 0
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7 Abstract in German 
 
Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, die Auswirkungen einer steuerfinanzierten 
Subvention, auf das Verhalten von Unternehmen und ethischen 
Investitionen zu untersuchen. Basierend auf dem Gleichgewichtsmodel 
von Heinkel Zechner und Kraus (2001) wird veranschaulicht, dass eine 
steuerfinanzierte Subvention mit fixen Steuersätzen die Bedeutung von 
Grünen Investoren auf das Verhalten von Unternehmen mit 
Umweltschädlicher Politik verringert bzw. aufhebt. Zusätzlich zu dem 
Einfluss von fixen Steuersätzen wird auch das Verhalten mit variablen 
Steuersätzen untersucht. Das bedeutet dass, dass die Anzahl der 
Unternehmen welche bereit ist zu reformieren und eine umweltfreundliche 
Politik zu verfolgen, bei einem fixen Steuersatz, weitgehend unabhängig 
ist von der Anzahl der grünen Investoren im Markt und deren exklusiver 
Investitionspolitik aber gleichzeitig die gesamtwirtschaftlichen 
Kapitalkosten mehr erhöht als im ursprünglichen Modell von Heinkel 
Zechner und Kraus 2001. Im Falle einer Variabeln Steuer ist der 
Subventionseffekt nur innerhalb einer limitierten Anzahl von grünen 
Investoren besser gegenüber den Resultaten von Heinkel Zechner und 
Kraus 2001. 
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